RAW MATERIALS, PROCESSING INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP by Gilbert, John
Raw Materials, Processing Incentives and Foreign Ownership
John Gilbert
Postdoctoral Fellow








The effect of foreign ownership on trade policy outcomes has long  been a topic of interest, but only
recently have the consequences of multiple levels of production been considered.  We examine processing
incentives in a simplified general equilibrium framework with foreign ownership of a primary factor.
Second-best considerations mean non-intervention is sub-optimal, but multiple levels of production can
lead to an investment terms-of-trade effect of indeterminate sign, depending critically on the production
structure.  We illustrate how this may change standard conclusions regarding the effect of trade
restrictions where there is foreign ownership, and optimal intervention to achieve specific policy
objectives.
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1.   Introduction
In many economies where a significant proportion of exports are primary products, there have
been vocal calls for processing incentives.  Many of these same economies have been the recipients of
foreign investment.  An example is New Zealand.  The majority of New Zealand's forest resources are
owned by foreign interests, as a result of government sales in the late 1980s.  In response to a negative
perception of increased log sales, there have been numerous calls to follow the example of Indonesia and
others and impose export restrictions, to expand domestic processing.  Hence, an analysis of the
implications of processing incentives and foreign ownership is of considerable practical interest.
The presence of foreign owned factors of production in an economy has long been a topic of
interest in international trade theory, but the literature focuses almost exclusively on final goods models.
Beladi and Marjit (1992) make an interesting extension to consider export processing zones, but do not
consider a production structure with multiple levels.  More recently,  Marjit and Beladi (1996) consider
tariff-jumping foreign investment into an intermediate sector.  Marjit et al. (1997) consider the same issue
in the context of a Harris-Todaro model.  Both of these significant contributions reach the conclusion that,
in contrast to the conventional argument of Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), tariff-jumping investment
may not be immiserizing if it flows into an intermediate sector.
While Marjit and Beladi (1996) provide a counter to the received wisdom on tariff-jumping, pre-
existing foreign ownership c an provide  an  incentive to  distort trade, or a disincentive to liberalize
(Bhagwati and Tironi, 1980; Bhagwati and Brecher, 1980; Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981).  The Stolper-
Samuelson effect of intervention can lower returns to foreign owned factors, raising national welfare.
The issue described above concerns how this argument stands up when the investment is in an
intermediate sector.  Thus, this paper is intended to complement Marjit and Beladi (1996), by considering
the dual foreign ownership problem.  Like Marjit and Beladi, we conclude in a strikingly different way
from the conventional literature – under plausible circumstances pre-existing foreign investment provides
no incentive to distort trade, and no disincentive to liberalization.2
Section 2 develops the basic welfare decomposition for an export tax, Section 3 presents the
effects on income distribution and output under one potential specification where the standard result is
maintained, and Section 4 explores a plausible alternative that reverses the standard result.  Section 5
briefly considers other processing incentives, while Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2.  Processing Incentives and Welfare
We consider a three good model.  Let the production of an aggregate importable (manufactures)
be industry 0, raw material production be industry 1, and processing be industry 2.  The economy uses
three primary factors of production, labor (L), capital ( K) and natural resources ( N), assumed to be
available in fixed supply and fully employed.  Natural resources are owned by foreign interests, who
receive the income stream generated by those assets.  Ownership of factors and world prices are
exogenous to the system to highlight the basic issues involved.
We assume that the production functions of all three goods have standard properties (they are
positive, continuous, concave for inputs greater than zero, and linearly homogeneous).  Perfect
competition prevails.  All goods are freely tradable, and the economy exports raw materials and processed
goods in exchange for manufactures.   Consumers have identical preferences, and their individual utility
functions can be aggregated into a direct social utility function  ) , ( 2 z z u o , where  i z  is the consumption of
good i.  Raw materials are a 'pure' intermediate, they do not enter the utility function.  The social utility
function is non-negative, continuous, quasi-concave, and increasing in consumption of all goods.
The budget constraint facing the economy in the presence of foreign ownership and an export tax
on the raw material can be expressed in terms of the GNP and expenditure functions as:
2 , 0 , 3 ... 0 ) , ( ) , , , ( 1 = = = - + j i u p E N n ty N L K p G j i (1)3
where  N n  is the payment for the use of foreign factors of production,  1 y  is net output (exports) of raw
materials, and t is the tax on those exports.  Revenue associated with the tax is redistributed in a lump-
sum fashion that does not favor any particular class of factor owner.
We assume the GNP and expenditure functions are continuous. Differentiating (1) totally holding
factor endowments and all prices except  1 p  constant, and simplifying by making use of the definition of
imports and the fact that  dt dp dp - =
*
1 1 :
dn N tdy dW - = 1 (2)
where  du E dW u ” .  The incremental change in welfare is the movement of exports across the trade
distortion minus the change in payments to the foreign owned natural resources.  To explore the signs that
the two components of (2) may take in a model with multiple levels of production, we need to consider
the production structure that underlies the GNP function.
3.  General Equilibrium Framework
Assume raw materials are produced using labor (L) and the specific factor natural resources (N),
while manufactures are produced using labor and the specific factor capital (K).  These two industries
form what in the parlance of Jones and Spencer (1989) is the primary tier of the economy.  The secondary
tier consists of processing, using labor and raw materials.  The profit maximizing are:
0
0 ) , ( p r w c = (3)
1
1 ) , ( p n w c = (4)
2 1
2 ) , ( p p w c = (5)4
Factor prices are uniquely determined by equations (3)-(5) in this model .  Differentiating totally


























































where the  ij q  are cost shares and a hat denotes relative changes (i.e.,  w dw w ” ˆ ).  Solving for the relative
changes in factor prices yields:
1 2 2 ˆ ) ( ˆ
1 p w L q q q - = (6)
1 0 2 2 0 ˆ ) ( ˆ
1 p r K L q L q q q q = (7)
1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ ] ) ( [ ˆ
1 p n L N q L L q q q q q + = (8)
Equations (6)-(8) reveal that an export tax on raw materials causes the real return to owners of
natural resources and owners of capital to fall, and the real return to labor to rise.  Hence, the second term
in equation (2) is negative.  An export tax has a beneficial effect on home welfare by  reducing the
payments to foreign owners of natural resources – as in the final goods only models.
Of course, given the assumed objective of increasing processing, we are restricting ourselves to
second-best policies here – the optimal policy would be to tax natural resources directly.
1  Governments
may, however, prefer their nationalization to take this more subtle form.
                                                                
1 Huizinga and Nielson (1997) have recently considered optimal taxation policy with foreign firms.  See also Chao
and Yu (1996).5
It follows that, in this simple model, intervention will raise domestic welfare, as in the standard
analysis.  The first term of (2) is negative under our assumptions, and it is elementary to derive the effect
of intervention on output.  Factor market equilibrium requires:
K g a K = 0 0   (9)
L g a g a g a L L L = + + 2 2 1 1 0 0 (10)
N g a N = 1 1 (11)
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where the  ij l  are the proportions of factor j used by industry i.  Substituting in expressions for the relative
changes in the optimal input-output coefficients yields after some manipulation:
 2
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 0 0 0 w r g L - = s q (12)
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 1 1 1 w n g L - = s q (13)
L q L L L w p w n w r g 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 )) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ( ˆ
1 l s q l s l s l - - - - - - = (14)
                                                                
2 The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in industry 0 is  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( 0 0 0 r w a a L K - - ” s .  The
distributive share-weighted average of changes in the optimal input-output coefficients along the unit isoquant
vanish near the cost-minimization point:  0 ˆ ˆ
0 0 0 0 = + K K L L a a q q .  Similar pairs of equations can be constructed for
the other two industries.  Solving for the proportional changes in the input-output coefficients, substituting back into
the differential forms of (9)-(11) and rearranging yields the solutions for gross outputs.6
where the si are the elasticities of substitution between inputs in industry i. These expressions reveal that
gross output of manufactures (g0) and raw materials (g1) must fall, and gross output of processing (g2)
must rise.  The first two terms in the numerator of (14) reveal the effect of labor released from other
activities, the third the effect of substitution between labor and the now cheaper raw material.
Usage of the raw material in the processing industry has risen ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 1 2 2 2 1 w p a L q - - = s q  is positive)
and gross output has fallen, so net output of the raw material falls.  Raw materials are not consumed
directly, so exports fall with the imposition of the tax, and the first term in (2) is negative, as expected.
4.  An Alternative
While in the above model the standard result holds, once intermediates are introduced contrasting
results are possible.  Let us change the situation by allowing for capital to be used in all three industries
and to be perfectly mobile.  Using labels as above:
0
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1
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The corresponding effects on factor prices of an export tax applied to the raw materials are:
[ ] 1 0 2 ˆ ˆ
1 p w K q q q q - = (18)
[ ] 1 2 0 ˆ ˆ
1 p r q L q q q = (19)
[ ] 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 ˆ )} ( ) ( { ˆ
1 1 p n N K q K L L q L K q q q q q q q q q q + - + = (20)7
where  ) ( 2 0 0 2 K L K L q q q q q - ” .   0 > q  iff  K L K L 0 0 2 2 q q q q > .  We can now derive the following two
propositions:
PROPOSITION 1:  The export tax causes returns to owners of capital and labor to move in opposite
directions.
3
PROOF: See (18) and (19) and discussion above.  QED.
PROPOSITION 2: The real return to owners of natural resources will fall (rise) with the imposition of an
export tax if the processing activity is more intensive in the same (opposite) factor than manufacturing in
direct terms as in total terms.
PROOF: Note that the terms in the innermost brackets of (20) are the total cost shares of labor and capital
(the sums of the direct and indirect,  i.e: that used in the raw material, cost shares) in processing.  The
numerator of (20) will be positive iff  ( ) ( ) K L K q K L q L 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 q q q q q q q q > + + ,  and therefore the entire
expression will be negative iff this condition holds and  0 > q .  QED.
The intuition behind the result is clear.  The export tax provides an implicit subsidy to processing,
benefiting whichever factor is used intensively in processing (say, capital) and harming the other mobile
factor (labor).  The rise in the return to capital and the fall in the price of the raw material squeeze the
return to natural resources, but the price of labor falls.  If raw material production  is sufficiently labor
intensive, the return to natural resources rises.
                                                                
3 This results is stronger than that of Burgess (1976) despite the similarity of the model construction because of the
assumption that intermediates do not enter into the production function of the importable.8
The result implies that the second term of (2) can be negative, in contrast to the standard result.
Somewhat perversely, an export tax could result not only in a welfare loss from trade reduction, but also
from an increase in transfers to foreign interests.  Of course, the fact that the return to natural resources
can rise raises issues of stability.  In particular, we need to be sure that output of good 1 will fall with a




































ij i ij s q h =  is the elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of input j in industry 1,
1
ij s  is the partial elasticity of substitution, and 
* q  is the sum of the direct and indirect cost shares in
processing as in (20) above.  Evidently for the model to be stable we require that  q  and the term inside
the brackets of (21) take the opposite sign.  Clearly, this is possible even if  q  and 
* q  take opposite
signs.  In general, we require that the factor used intensively in processing be more substitutable with N
than the factor used intensively in industry 0 for a stable equilibrium to be feasible (the chances are
improved if N and the other factor are complementary).
5.  Other Processing Incentives and Specificity
While export restrictions are not the only means of increasing processing, alternative policies
have similar effects.  However, foreign ownership can alter standard 'specificity' conclusions.  We briefly
demonstrate.  Consider a policy that lowers the price of the raw material for processing, while holding the
price that domestic raw material producers receive constant.  Using techniques as above to solve for the
changes in factor returns we obtain the following:9
PROPOSITION 3: An input subsidy will result in an income transfer effect that is inferior from the home
country perspective to that of an export tax, under either specification.
PROOF: Under the first specification, the impact on wages and the return to capital will be identical to (6)
and (7), only the change in the return to natural resources will differ, becoming:
( )
s
L N q L p n 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ
1 q q q q = (22)
where 
s p1  is the subsidy inclusive price paid by processors.  The proportional change is larger in (8) by
N p 1 1 ˆ q .
In the alternative specification considered in Section 4:
[ ]
s
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1 q q q q q q q - = (23)
0 ˆ > n  iff  K L K L 0 0 1 1 q q q q >  and  0 < q , or vice versa.  Rewriting (20):
[ ] 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 ˆ )} ( { ˆ
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Equation (24) is directly comparable to (23).  In words, if the processing activity is more labor intensive
than general manufacturing, then  q  is positive.  If raw materials production is more capital intensive
than general manufacturing, then the owners of natural resources would unambiguously gain from an
input subsidy.  An export tax of equivalent magnitude would raise the return to owners of natural
resources by less, and may lower it, since  q  appears as an additive term in (24).  QED.10
The intuition behind the result is as follows.  With a subsidy the price received by raw material
producers remains unchanged, while the wage and capital rental rates change in the same proportion as
with an export tax.  Hence the residual return to natural resources is squeezed by less.
What are the implications?  First, it is not clear that either an export tax or an input subsidy will
raise welfare, since the sign of dn is indeterminate in both cases.  Second, foreign ownership in these
circumstances turns the standard specificity arguments around.  Although in general a subsidy will be
welfare superior to an export tax when the objective is to increase processing, the presence of foreign
ownership can reverse that result – yet another example of how second best considerations play havoc
with standard trade policy conclusions.
6.  Concluding Comments
In terms of simple models with multiple levels of production, we have shown that the presence of
foreign ownership may not provide a rationale for trade intervention (or a disincentive to liberalization),
in contrast to the results in the existing literature which concentrates on final goods models.  In addition,
we have shown that export restrictions may be superior to more direct support mechanisms under the
same circumstances.  These results complement those of Marjit and  Beladi (1996) and  Marjit et al.
(1997).  While the use of processing incentives has grown in popularity in recent decades, the results
suggest that considerable attention needs to be paid to production structures even where factors are
foreign owned, a favorable investment terms-of-trade effect cannot be assumed.11
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